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Abstract
We study the impacts of bankruptcy risk on markets for tradable environmental and natural
resource permits. We show that bankruptcy risk in a competitive market for tradable permits
causes an inefficient distribution of these permits among firms. Moreover, the equilibrium
distribution of permits is dependent of the initial distribution of permits. Thus, the main
reasons for implementing markets for environmental and natural resource rights do not hold
when some firms are financially insecure.
Support for this work was provided by the Cooperative State Research Extension, Education Service, U. S. Department of
Agriculture, Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station, and the Department of Resource Economics under Project No.
MAS00871. We gratefully acknowledge the comments and suggestions of L. Joe Moffitt.
Citation: Stranlund, John and Wei Zhang, (2008) "Bankruptcy risk and the performance of tradable permit markets."
Economics Bulletin, Vol. 17, No. 9 pp. 1-9
Submitted: January 23, 2008.  Accepted: April 3, 2008.
URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2008/volume17/EB-08Q20002A.pdf  1
1. Introduction 
Market-based polices have become an accepted approach to regulating environmental and 
natural resource externalities. Tradable permit policies have been designed and implemented to 
manage air and water pollution, fish harvests, water use, and land use (Tietenberg 2003). The 
fundamental value of competitive permit markets is that they produce the efficient allocation of 
individual rights to a resource under a fixed aggregate cap on these rights. Moreover, the 
equilibrium distribution of permits is independent of their initial allocation, giving regulators the 
freedom to use the initial allocation of permits to pursue other objectives, such as those arising 
from equity concerns or the exercise of political power, without upsetting the allocative 
efficiency property. (Montgomery 1972). 
Of course, the performance of tradable permit schemes depends critically on the 
assumption of competitive permit trading. Hahn (1984) was the first to demonstrate that market 
power in an emissions trading scheme would generally lead to an inefficient distribution of 
emissions control responsibilities, and that the initial distribution of permits would impact the 
equilibrium distribution of emission control. Similarly, Stavins (1995) demonstrated that variable 
transaction costs associated with trading emissions permits would lead to an inefficient 
distribution of emissions control among regulated firms, and that this distribution of control 
might depend on the initial allocation of permits.   
In this paper we examine how tradable permit markets perform in the presence of 
indebted firms who face a non-zero probability of bankruptcy, and show that financial insecurity 
is yet another potential source of allocative inefficiency. The key problem is the well-known 
limited liability effect of debt financing—firms do not consider negative returns in bankrupt 
states because debt holders become the residual claimants. With the continuing application of 
market-based policies into new environmental and natural resource settings, knowledge of how 
the financial health of regulated firms can impact the performance of market-based policies is an 
important consideration in the design and evaluation of these policies.  
We are not the first to demonstrate that the financial health of firms can impact the 
performance of markets. For example, Brander and Lewis (1986) show that the Nash equilibrium 
of a model of Cournot duopolists is affected by the firms’ debt levels. We are also not the first to 
demonstrate that bankruptcy risk may impact regulatory designs, including environmental and 
natural resource policies. Spiegel and Spulber (1994) investigate the interactions between the 
investment and financial decisions of firms and a regulator’s control of their output price. 
Damania (2000) explores the link between pollution taxes and the financial and output decisions 
of firms in an oligopolistic industry, and shows that there are circumstances under which highly 
leveraged firms respond to pollution taxes by increasing their emissions. In a more recent work, 
Damania and Bulte (2005) relate the harvest decisions of firms in a fishery to the financial 
structure of the industry and regulatory control.  
To our knowledge our work is the first to examine how bankruptcy risk and the limited 
liability effect impact the performance of tradable property rights regulations. We demonstrate 
that firms under these regulations that face a positive risk of bankruptcy will demand more 
permits than they would if they did not risk bankruptcy. Consequently, the decisions of 
financially distressed firms will cause the equilibrium distribution of permits to differ from the 
efficient distribution of permits. Moreover, the equilibrium distribution of permits and the 
allocative loss produced by financially distressed firms will depend on the initial distribution of 
permits. A smaller initial allocation of permits to distressed firms will increase their risk of 
bankruptcy and the allocative inefficiency of otherwise competitive permit trading when the   2
aggregate demand function for permits is decreasing in the permit price. Thus, there are welfare 
consequences of the initial distribution of permits that are not present when permit markets do 
not include financially distressed firms.  
 
2. A Model of an Indebted Firm under a Market-Based Regulation 
Consider an industry whose aggregate output is limited by a tradable output permit policy. 
Output in our model may be interpreted as emissions of a pollutant, fish harvests, water use, or 
units of land development. We assume that the industry contains a fixed number of 
heterogeneous firms. A firm’s output, q, generates profit,  () ( 1 ) qz π + , where z  is a continuous 
random variable that is independently (but not necessarily identically) distributed in the industry. 
This random variable captures the effects of uncertainty on the firm’s profit, such as the effects 
of random shifts in the demand for its output or random changes in its factor prices. The 
probability density function of z is () gz with support [, ] zz. The expectation of z is zero so that 
the firm’s expected profit is simply  () q π . We assume that the firm’s expected profit is strictly 
concave and greater than zero in the relevant range of output. The value of z is revealed only 
after all production and permit market decisions have been made.  
  The firm receives an initial endowment of permits l. Each permit gives the firm the right 
to produce one unit of output. Enforcement of the permit program is sufficient to induce full 
compliance, so the firm holds the same number of output permits as its level of output. Permit 
trading establishes a constant price per permit , p  which each firm takes as given. The firm’s 
expenditure or revenue from permit transactions is then () p ql − .  
  We focus the analysis on a single compliance period in which the firm’s financial 
structure is fixed and fully captured by its debt level D.
1 Given a realization ofz , the payoff to 
the shareholders of the firm is 
 (,) () ( 1 ) ( ) vqz q z pq l D π =+ − − − .            (1)                        
If ( , ) vqz turns out to be negative the firm declares bankruptcy and uses its earnings (if they are 
positive) to partially pay off its creditors. There are no other costs of declaring bankruptcy. If 
(,) vqzturns out to be greater than zero, the firm remains solvent.  
  Define a critical breakeven state, ˆ z , in which the firm’s profit is just sufficient for it to 
meet its debt obligation and avoid bankruptcy: 
   ˆˆ ˆ |(,) () ( 1 ) ( ) 0 zz v e z q z p q l D π == + − − − = .       ( 2 )  
Solving for  ˆ z  yields    
   () ˆ () ( ) 1 zp q l Dq π =− + − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ .       ( 3 )      
If the realized value of z is greater than ˆ z , the firm remains solvent, but it is insolvent if the 
realized value of z is less than  ˆ z . The probability that the firm avoids bankruptcy is the 
probability that  ˆ zz ≥ ; that is,
ˆ ()
z
z gzd z ∫ . Clearly, the probability of bankruptcy increases with  ˆ z . 
Note that if  ˆ zz ≤ , the firm is financially secure in the sense that it does not risk bankruptcy. At 
the other end of the range of z,  ˆ zz ≥  implies that the firm will definitely be insolvent. In this 
case the firm will not even bother to begin production. In the more interesting cases in which 
                                                 
1 Clearly, as in Brander and Lewis (1986), we are abstracting away from the firm’s capital investment decision and 
its mix of debt and equity financing. We do this to focus directly on how the risk of bankruptcy affects decisions in 
the permit market.    3
ˆ (,) zz z ∈ , the probabilities that the firm will be solvent or insolvent are both strictly between 
one and zero.  
  From (3), the first derivatives of  ˆ z  for ˆ (,) zz z ∈  are: 
        ˆ () 0 l zp q π =− < ;  ˆ 1( )0 D zq π => ;  ˆ () ( ) p zq lq π = − ;  [ ] ˆˆ () ( 1 ) () q zp qz q ππ ′ =− + . (4) 
(Derivatives are indicated by subscripts in the usual fashion). Recalling that  () 0 q π > , note that 
an increase in the initial allocation of permits reduces the breakeven value of z and the 
probability that it will be forced to declare bankruptcy. Of course, an increase in the firm’s debt 
payment, D, increases  ˆ z  and the probability the firm will be insolvent. The effect of a change in 
the price of permits on the probability of insolvency depends on whether the firm is a net buyer 
or net seller of permits. If the firm sells permits, an increase in the price of permits increases the 
value of the firm and reduces the probability that it will be bankrupt. If the firm buys permits, a 
price increase increases the likelihood the firm will be insolvent. Finally, the effect of the firm’s 
level of output on the likelihood of insolvency depends on the relationship between the permit 
price and the firm’s marginal profit evaluated at  ˆ z . In general the sign of  ˆq z  is indeterminate, 
but it easy to show that it is positive when the firm chooses its production optimally. 
  The manager of the firm is risk neutral and chooses the firm’s output to maximize the 
expected value of the firm. Denote the expectation of  (,) vqz as  (,) Vqz. Therefore, 
   []
ˆ (,) () ( 1 ) ( ) ()
z
z Vqz q z pq l Dgzd z π =+ − − − ∫ .     (5) 
Throughout we assume that  ( , ) Vqz is strictly concave in q for every feasible value of z, and that 
the firm optimally chooses a positive level of output. Note that the manager optimizes over 
ˆ (, ) zz instead of the whole support of z, because the firm earns nothing when it is bankrupt. 
 
3. Bankruptcy Risk and a Firm’s Demand for Permits 
If a firm is financially secure,  ˆ zz ≤  and (5) reduces to  ( ) ( ) ( ) Vq q pq l D π = −− − . In this case, 
the firm chooses its output so that  ) (q p π′ = , which is the familiar condition that a firm chooses 
its output and permit demand to equate its marginal expected profit to the going permit price. If 
no firm under a tradable permit program risks bankruptcy, their production choices equate their 
expected marginal profits. This forms the set of necessary conditions for maximizing expected 
industry profit, given that aggregate output is limited to some exogenous standard. Moreover, it 
is clear that the firms’ output choices do not depend on their permit allocations.  
  Matters are very different if some firms risk bankruptcy. Given our assumptions that (5) 
is strictly concave in a firm’s output and that the firm chooses positive output, the following first 
order condition is both necessary and sufficient to uniquely determine its optimal choice of 
output: 
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ [( ) ( 1 ) ] ( ) ( ) [ ( ) ( 1 ) ( ) ]0 qq
z
z V q zp g z d z z g z q zp q lD ππ ′ =+ − − + − − − = ∫ . Using the 
definition of  ˆ z  provided by (2), the first order condition simplifies to 
  
ˆ [( ) ( 1 ) ] ( ) 0 q
z
z Vq z p g z d z π′ =+ − = ∫ .        ( 6 )  
Rearranging (6) gives us  
   )] ˆ | ( 1 )[ ( z z z E q p ≥ + ′ =π ,         ( 7 )  
where    
  
ˆˆ ˆ (| ) () ()
zz
zz E zz z z gzd z gzd z ≥= ∫∫        ( 8 )    4
is the expectation of z (E is the expectation operator) conditional on the firm being solvent. In 
fact, the right hand side of (7) is the firm’s expected marginal profit over states in which it avoids 
bankruptcy. Again, the limited bankruptcy liability of the firm causes it to choose its output to 
optimize only over the states in which it will be solvent.   
  The presence of  ˆ (| ) Ezz z > in (7) is an adjustment of the firm’s choice of output that 
reflects its risk of bankruptcy. This term disappears when the risk of bankruptcy is zero. 
Moreover, since 
ˆ () () 0
zz
zz zg z dz zg z dz >= ∫∫  when  ˆ (,) zz z ∈ ,  ˆ (| ) Ezz z ≥  is strictly positive 
when the firm risks bankruptcy. This implies that a financially distressed firm will choose its 
output so that ) (q p π′ > . This implies further that, given the permit price, its output will be 
higher than if it did not risk bankruptcy.  
  The fact that a financially insecure firm does not equate its expected marginal profit to 
the price of permits leads directly to one of our main results about the impact of financial 
insecurity on the performance of competitive permit trading—a tradable permit program that 
contains financially insecure firms will not distribute individual output in the way that 
maximizes expected industry profit. Accomplishing this requires that all firms’ production 
choices equate their individual expected marginal profits. However, firms that risk bankruptcy 
choose output so that their expected marginal profits are lower than the going permit price, while 
firms that do not risk bankruptcy choose their output to equate their expected marginal profit to 
the permit price. Moreover, expected marginal profits among financially distressed firms will 
likely differ because the values of  ˆ z will vary across these firms and the densities g(z) may vary 
as well.  Since the permit market will not equate the firms’ expected marginal profits, expected 
industry profit will not be maximized. Thus, the main reason for implementing permit trading 
programs does not hold in situations involving financially insecure firms.  
  Moreover, the distribution of individual output choices will not be independent of the 
initial allocation of permits, because financially distressed firms’ demands for permits will 
depend on these allocations. To see how, obtain the comparative static  ql qq q lV V ∂ ∂= −  in the 
usual manner.  Since 0 qq V <  by assumption, the sign of  ql ∂ ∂  is the same as the sign of  ql V . 
Differentiate (6) with respect to l and substitute  ˆl z  from (4) into the result to obtain 
() ( ) ˆˆ () ' () ( 1 ) () ql Vp q qz p g z ππ =+ − . To sign this, first note that  ˆˆ (| ) zE z zz < > . Furthermore, 
since  )] ˆ | ( 1 )[ ( z z z E q ≥ + ′ π   0 = − p  from (7),  ˆˆ (| ) zE z zz < ≥  implies  0 ) ˆ 1 )( ( ' < − + p z q π . This, 
in turn, implies  0 ql V < . Therefore,  0 ql ∂∂ <, indicating that a financially distressed firm’s 
output is decreasing in its initial allocation of permits. Intuitively, an increase in a firm’s 
allocation of permits increases the value of the firm, all else equal. Since this then reduces the 
firm’s risk of bankruptcy, it will choose its output so that the gap between the permit price and 
() q π′  is reduced. This leads to a lower level of output for a given permit price.  
  To complete this section, let us determine the effect of a change in the permit price on a 
financially distressed firm’s output. As above, the comparative static qp qq qp VV ∂ ∂= −  has the 
same sign as  qp V . From (6) and  ˆp z  from (4) obtain  
   []
ˆ ˆˆ () ( ) ()[ () ( 1 ) ]() qp
z
z Vg z d z q l q q z p g z ππ ′ =− − − + − ∫ . 
Note that the first term of  qp V  is negative. However, recall that  0 ) ˆ 1 )( ( ' < − + p z q π  so the sign of 
the second term of  qp V  depends on whether the firm is a net buyer or seller of permits. If the firm   5
sells permits () ql < ,  qp V  and  qp ∂∂  are both negative, indicating that its output is decreasing in 
the permit price. However, if the firm buys permits () ql > , the sign of  qp V  is indeterminate 
because its second term is positive. Note that it is possible that the permit demand function for a 
firm that simultaneously risks bankruptcy and optimally chooses to buy permits may be upward 
sloping. This is consistent with a result of Damania and Bulte (2005) who found that an increase 
in regulatory stringency to induce more conservative harvests in a fishery can lead to increased 
harvests by firms that risk bankruptcy. Increased regulatory stringency in our model means that 
the aggregate cap on output is reduced and fewer permits are issued. Under most circumstances 
we would expect this to increase the price of permits and lead all firms to reduce their output. 
However, a financially distressed firm that is a net buyer of permits may react to the reduced cap 
on aggregate output and increased permit price by increasing its output.  
 
4. The Initial Allocation of Permits and the Market Effects of Bankruptcy Risk 
We now examine the market effects of bankruptcy risk and limited liability, particularly the role 
that the initial allocation of permits plays in determining market outcomes and the allocative 
efficiency of competitive permit trading. We focus on the initial permit allocation for two 
reasons. First, decreasing the initial supply of permits to financially distressed firms increases 
their risk of bankruptcy, everything else equal. Therefore, we can trace out the effects of varying 
bankruptcy risk on permit markets by varying the initial allocation of permits. Second, since we 
have just demonstrated that the initial permit allocation will certainly impact permit markets 
when some firms risk bankruptcy, the initial allocation has efficiency consequences that cannot 
be ignored.  
  We simplify the analysis by assuming that a permit trading program contains just two 
types of firms. Type 1 firms do not risk bankruptcy while type 2 firms do. There are  i n  identical 
firms of type i = 1, 2.  Let  , i l i q  and  i π  denote the initial allocation of permits, output, and 
expected profit function for each type ifirm. Recall that the first order condition that determines 
the financially secure firms’ output is 11 () p q π′ = , which is independent of their initial allocations 
of permits. Thus, their equilibrium output is written as  1() qp. From the strict concavity of  11 () q π , 
it is straightforward to show that 1() qp is monotonically decreasing in p. In the last section we 
explored how the output of the firms that risk bankruptcy depends on the permit price and their 
initial allocations of permits. Therefore, we write each type 2 firms’ output as  22 (,) qp l.  
  With an aggregate supply of permits equal to L, the permit market clears if and only if 
11 22 2 () (,) nq p nq pl L += . This equilibrium condition implicitly defines the equilibrium price of 
permits,  2 (,) p Ll . Now differentiate the identity  L l l L p q n l L p q n ≡ + ) ), , ( ( )) , ( ( 2 2 2 2 2 1 1  with respect 
to  2 l  to obtain the effect of the allocation of permits to the firms that risk bankruptcy on the 
equilibrium permit price:  
   ( ) ( ) [ ] p q n dp dq n l q n l p ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ − = ∂ ∂ 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 /   .     (9) 
  The numerator of the right hand side of (9) is positive because  . 0 / 2 2 < ∂ ∂ l q  The 
denominator is the slope of the aggregate demand function for permits. In general, the impact of 
the permit price on the aggregate demand function is indeterminate because of the possibility that 
the financially insecure firms’ permit demands are increasing in the permit price. For most of the 
rest of the analysis we assume that the aggregate demand function for permits is decreasing in 
the permit price, because we believe this is the most likely case in real applications. We will,   6
however, briefly note the consequences of an upward sloping aggregate demand function at the 
end of this section. Under the assumption that the denominator of (9) is negative,  0 2 < ∂ ∂ l p . 
This indicates that the equilibrium permit price is increasing as the allocation of permits to 
financially distressed firms is reduced. Consequently, increased bankruptcy risk in a market for 
tradable permits is likely to produce a higher permit price. 
  In turn, the higher permit price changes the output of financially secure and insecure 
firms in opposite directions. Since  1 0 dq dp < , reducing the initial allocation of permits for the 
financially insecure firms decreases the output of the financially secure firms through the 
increase in the permit price. Holding aggregate output to L, then, requires that the equilibrium 
response of the insecure firms to a decrease in their initial allocation of permits is that they 
increase their output. To demonstrate this formally, note that ( )( ) 22 2 2 / qpp l ql ∂ ∂∂ ∂+ ∂∂  is the 
equilibrium response of a financially distressed firm to a change in its permit allocation. While 
we’ve shown that the direct effect,  2 2 / l q ∂ ∂ , is less than zero, the sign of the indirect effect, 
() () 22 qpp l ∂∂∂ ∂, is ambiguous because the sign of  2 qp ∂ ∂  is ambiguous. However, the total 
effect is negative. To see this substitute (9) into ( )( ) 22 2 2 / qpp l ql ∂ ∂∂ ∂+ ∂∂  to obtain 







nd qd p q l
qpp l ql
nd qd p n q p
∂∂
∂∂∂ ∂+ ∂∂ =
+ ∂∂
.    (10) 
Under the assumption that the aggregate demand for permits is downward sloping, the sign of 
(10) is negative because  1 0 dq dp <  and  22 /0 ql ∂ ∂<. Therefore, increased bankruptcy risk can 
increase the number of permits demanded by financially insecure firms, but decrease the number 
of permits demanded by financially secure firms.   
  Finally let us determine how the initial allocation of permits and bankruptcy risk affects 
expected industry profit at the aggregate cap on output. Using the equilibrium output levels for 
type 1 and type 2 firms,  ( ) 12 (,) qp L l and  ( ) 22 2 (,) , qp L ll, expected equilibrium industry profit is  
   () () ( ) ( ) 11 1 2 22 2 2 2 (,) (,) , nq p L l n q p L l l ππ Π= + .      ( 1 1 )  
The constraint on aggregate output implies  ( ) ( ) ( ) 12 2 22 2 1 (,) (,) , q pLl L nq pLl l n =− . Substitute 
this into (11) and differentiate with respect to  2 l  to obtain 
   ( )( ) 22 21 2 2 2 2 () ln qpp l ql ππ ′′ ∂Π ∂ = − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ +∂ ∂ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ .      ( 1 2 )    
Recall that the firms that do not face bankruptcy choose their output so that  11 () pq π′ = , but that 
firms that do risk bankruptcy choose production so that  ) ( 2 2 q p π′ > . Therefore,  0 1 2 < ′ − ′ π π  in a 
market equilibrium. The last term of (12) contains the equilibrium effect of changing  2 l  on the 
output of type 2 firms, the combination of which we’ve just shown to be negative when the 
aggregate demand function is downward sloping. Therefore,  2 0 l ∂Π∂ >  so that expected 
aggregate profit when holding the industry’s output to L is increasing in the initial allocation of 
permits to firms that risk bankruptcy. Consequently, increased bankruptcy risk in a tradable 
permit market can reduce expected industry profit.  
  To be complete, let us briefly note how these results change if the aggregate permit 
demand function is increasing in the permit price at the equilibrium. In this case, a lower permit 
allocation to financially insecure firms actually reduces the equilibrium permit price. 
Consequently, the financially secure firms increase their output while the insecure firms decrease 
output. Moreover, the sign of  2 l ∂Π ∂  is reversed, indicating that decreasing the allocation of   7
permits to financially insecure firms can increase industry expected profit, but only when the 
aggregate demand function for permits is upward sloping at the equilibrium.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
We have generated several policy-relevant conclusions about the impact of bankruptcy risk on 
the performance of market-based regulations. The most important are that the presence of 
bankruptcy risk reduces the allocative efficiency of competitive output permit markets, and 
makes the distribution of individual output choices dependent on the initial allocation of permits. 
Thus, the fundamental values of competitive tradable permit markets do not hold when some 
firms in the market risk bankruptcy. Financial insecurity, like market power and transaction 
costs, is yet another problem that can prevent markets in tradable property rights from fulfilling 
their theoretical promises.  
  While we have focused on the performance of tradable permit programs in this paper, our 
results suggest that the inefficiency associated with bankruptcy risk will also be present in other 
incentive-based policies, and may actually be worse. For example, policies with auctioned 
permits can be viewed as tradable permit programs without freely-given initial permit 
allocations. Since we’ve shown a negative relationship between the initial allocation of permits 
to financially insecure firms and market inefficiency when aggregate demand for permits is 
decreasing in the permit price, an auction, which allocates zero permits to all firms, would seem 
to maximize the inefficiency associated with bankruptcy risk. An output tax would produce the 
same result. Thus, from the singular perspective of the inefficiency caused by bankruptcy risk, 
the free allocation of permits to financially distressed firms may be more efficient than other 
incentive-based policies that do not have this feature.  
One may be tempted to use our results to suggest that regulators can use the initial 
distribution of permits to mitigate the inefficiency associated with bankruptcy risk. However, 
doing so would not be a trivial undertaking. There are certainly difficulties associated with 
asymmetric information. A regulator must know which firms are in financial distress, which may 
not be readily available. Perhaps more importantly, firms may misrepresent their bankruptcy risk 
to obtain a greater allocation of permits. On the other hand, financially secure firms might argue 
convincingly that allocating more permits to insecure firms would basically be a subsidy for 
poorly performing firms. Finally, using the initial allocation to promote efficient permit markets 
would have to overcome the tendency to allocate permits by some sort of grandfathering rule. 
Those who would benefit from grandfathered permits would argue that this is a fair way to 
allocate permits, while ignoring the efficiency consequences of doing so.  
  There are many possible extensions of our model and results. Let us mention just a few. 
While we have focused on a static model of permit trading, modeling bankruptcy risk in dynamic 
permit markets (that may or may not allow some form of permit banking) would force us to 
examine the impact of financial insecurity on the efficiency of these markets over time as well as 
across firms. We have also assumed a fixed number of firms under a tradable property rights 
regulation. However, financial distress makes the endogeneity of the number of firms in an 
industry and the associated impacts on permit market efficiency an interesting area for future 
work. Finally, while we have assumed that firms fully comply with their output permits, 
allowing for noncompliance would likely yield interesting insights into the relationship between 
bankruptcy risk and compliance choices, and how these market difficulties work together to 
impact the performance of tradable permit programs.   8
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